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BASIC FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway*
I. INTRODUCTION
The free exercise clause' has been under attack in recent years.
Under the guardianship of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the
scope of the constitutional freedom of religion has been shrinking.
But the clause is still on the books, and courts continue to hold gov-
ernment action unconstitutional from time to time because it en-
croaches too far on the free exercise of religion.
How does the free exercise clause work? This article describes
the basic structure of free exercise analysis. The purpose is to help
law students, lawyers, and judges understand and apply the diverse
strands of Supreme Court analysis in this interesting and important
field of constitutional law.
The legal analysis developed by the Supreme Court in its effort
to enforce the free exercise clause is summarized in the following
outline:
Free Exercise Clause; Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits
A. Applicability: Did the government substantially burden
claimant for believing or doing something prohibited by
claimant's religion or for refraining from believing or
doing something compelled by claimant's religion?
1. Religion?
© 1989 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia University
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The clause provides, "Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise thereof [of religion]." The clause is applicable not only to Con-
gress, but also to other branches of the federal government and, because it protects a funda-
mental right, to the branches of state and local government as well. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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2. Substantial burden?
B. Compliance: Can the government satisfy the rules
developed by the Supreme Court for enforcing the
clause?
1. Burden based on religious belief: absolute ban
2. Burden based on religious conduct
a. General rule: stirct scrutiny (presumption of
unconstitutionality; government has burden of
proof)
1) Does the government action further a
compelling interest?
a) Compelling interest?
(1) Actual interest?
(2) Permissible interest?
(3) Very strong interest?
b) Substantially effective means?
2) Is the government action necessary?
b. Exceptions: rationality review (presumption of
constitutionality; claimant has burden of proof)
1) Applicability
a) Military context? or
b) Prison context? or
c) Other context where judicial deference
is needed?
2) Compliance
a) Legitimate interest?
b) Rational means?
III. Remedies
Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seeking re-
dress for an alleged violation of the free exercise clause must initially
meet three preliminary requirements.' First, the court must have ju-
risdiction over the claim. Second, the claim must be justiciable.
Third, the conduct giving rise to the claim must be government ac-
tion. Failure to satisfy any of these requirements normally results in
dismissal without reaching the merits of the free exercise claim.
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the court will
proceed to the merits of the claim. On the merits, the analysis has
two components.' First, one must determine whether the free exer-
2. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout constitutional
law.
3. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional limits. See
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cise clause is applicable, that is, whether the government has im-
posed a substantial burden or denied a substantial benefit because
claimant believed or did something required by his or her religion or
refused to believe or do something prohibited by his or her religion.
If the free exercise clause is found to be applicable, one must
determine whether the government complied with the rules devel-
oped by the Supreme Court for enforcing the clause. Initially, the
rules break down into two categories. First, the clause absolutely
bans government action which disadvantages, claimant because of re-
ligious belief.4 Second, government action that disadvantages claim-
ant because of religiously motivated conduct is subject to a more
complex set of rules. In most cases, strict scrutiny applies, and the
government action is unconstitutional unless the government proves
that its action is necessary to further a compelling interest.' If the
challenged government action is by military or prison authorities, in
contrast, rationality review is applicable, and claimant must prove
that the action is not a rational means to further any legitimate gov-
ernment interest.
If the free exercise clause is inapplicable or its requirements are
met, the analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the clause is applicable
and its requirements are not met, one must proceed to the question
of remedies.' The next section discusses each step of basic free exer-
cise clause analysis in more detail.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary questions
Before reaching the merits, a free exercise clause claimant must
satisfy the three standard preliminary requirements that apply
throughout constitutional law, that is, that the government harmed
claimant enough to create a justiciable claim that is within the juris-
diction of the court.
Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775 (1988). In applying
any constitutional restriction on government action, one should ask first whether the limit is
applicable-that is, is this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit? - and
second whether the government complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed for
enforcing the limit. In short, the analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit focuses on
two questions: 1) applicability and 2) compliance.
4. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
7. See infra p. 878.
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1. Does the court have jurisdiction?
First, claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction over
the claim. Jurisdiction is normally a statutory rather than a constitu-
tional issue, and thus is beyond the scope of this article.' The juris-
diction requirement sometimes raises issues in free exercise clause
cases. This article will assume that jurisdiction is present in all rele-
vant cases.
2. Is the claim justiciable?
Next, to qualify for a decision on the merits, free exercise
claims must involve a justiciable controversy between adverse parties.
Justiciability problems surface repeatedly in free exercise clause
cases. Recently, for example, the Court devoted two pages of its
opinion in a major free exercise case to the issue whether the rule of
necessity barred reaching the merits of the claim.9 Similarly, the
claim may be unripe or moot, or claimant may not have standing.
This article will not analyze these justiciability issues.
3. Was the harm caused by government action?
Finally, the free exercise clause, like most other constitutional
limits, applies only to the government. If the challenged action was
by a government official, the government action requirement is met
unless the conduct was unrelated to the official's government duties.
If the challenged action was by a private person or entity, the gov-
ernment action requirement is not met unless the government either
compelled the action or encouraged it so substantially that the action
must be attributed to the government."
If claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary requirements,
8. In one of the Supreme Court's most recent free exercise cases. Frasee v. Illinois Dept.
of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989), jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)
(1982).
9. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1323-24
(1988).
10. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982):
[Clonstitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is
responsible for the specific conduct of which plaintiff complains. . . . [A] State
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.
A symbiotic relationship between the government and the private party in which the govern-
ment profits from the private conduct may also satisfy the government action requirement,
although the status of this rule is in doubt. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961).
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the claim should be dismissed without reaching the merits of the free
exercise clause issues. If claimant satisfies the preliminary require-
ments, one may proceed to evaluate the free exercise claim on the
merits.
B. On the merits: Was the free exercise clause violated?
Analysis of free exercise claims on the merits involves the same
two-step inquiry that applies to all constitutional limits. One must
determine first whether the free exercise clause is applicable, that is,
whether the government action that harmed claimant was the kind of
government action that is subject to the clause. If the clause is appli-
cable, one must determine second whether the government has com-
plied with applicable free exercise clause requirements.
1. Applicability: Did the government impose a burden or
deny a benefit based on religiously motivated belief or conduct?
The free exercise clause applies only to government conduct
that disadvantages claimant because of religiously motivated belief or
conduct by claimant. To determine whether the clause is applicable,
one must ask first whether the belief or conduct giving rise to the
government action is religious and second whether the disadvantage
imposed on claimant is the kind that is subject to the clause.
a. Religion
The free exercise clause applies only when the government dis-
advantages claimant because of some religiously motivated belief or
action on the part of claimant." Surprisingly, however, the Supreme
Court has never formulated an explicit definition of "religion."' 2
Traditionally, the core concept is that religion concerns belief in
God, that is, "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving du-
ties superior to those arising from any human relation."1 " Modern
cases suggest that non-theistic beliefs may also qualify as religious if
they are the functional equivalent of belief in God. As the Court put
11. "There is no doubt that '[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause,' .... " Frasee, 109 S. Ct. at 1517 (citations omitted). The belief may be
entirely individual; it need not be endorsed by a religious organization. Id.
12. "A fundamental problem runs throughout the field of freedom of religion: what is a
religion? The Court has not directly answered this question." J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 341 (1986).
13. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560)
(1958).
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it in United States v. Seeger," the test "is whether a given belief that
is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God . . .,"' If reli-
gious belief or conduct is involved, the claim may proceed to the next
level of analysis.
b. Cognizable burden or denial of benefit
The free exercise clause applies to government action that sub-
stantially burdens the exercise of religion. 6 Moreover, it protects in-
dividuals from indirect as well as direct burdens. 7 However, it does
not apply to all forms of government action that interfere with the
exercise of religion. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protec-
tive Association,18 for example, the Court held that building a road
through National Forest land does not trigger free exercise scrutiny
even though the land is highly sacred to several Indian tribes and the
road "will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their
religion." 9
Lyng makes clear that the severity of the burden is not always
controlling and that the form of the burden may determine whether
the clause applies. Stressing that the clause applies only to govern-
ment action that "prohibits" the free exercise of religion,20 the Lyng
majority indicated that government interference with religion triggers
free exercise scrutiny only if it has a "tendency to coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs."'"
14. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
15. Id. at 166. Although this test concerns the meaning of a federal draft statute rather
than the Constitution, it is widely understood as applicable to the free exercise clause as well.
16. E.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2148 (1989) ("The free exercise in-
quiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice ...."). Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985),
for example, the Court held that federal wage and hour requirements do not impose enough of
a burden to trigger free exercise analysis, because employees who have religious objections to
receiving wages can simply give them back to the employer. Id. at 303-04.
17. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) ("While the compul-
sion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial."); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
19. Id. at 1324.
20. "The crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit'. Id. at 1326.
21.
This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs,
which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, re-
quire government to bring forth a compelling justification for its otherwise law-
ful actions.
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Lyng suggests that the only government burdens on religion
that require free exercise analysis are those that 1) penalize belief or
conduct prescribed by religion or 2) require belief or conduct pro-
scribed by religion. In explaining why, despite claimants' sincere re-
ligious objections, building a road through sacred land and using so-
cial security numbers to identify individuals do not burden the
exercise of religion in a manner cognizable under the free exercise
clause, the Court stated, "In neither case, however, would the af-
fected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violat-
ing their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action pe-
nalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the
rights, benefits; and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."22
Moreover, even in cases where the government punishes a per-
son for conduct required by religion, the burden does not trigger free
exercise scrutiny if the conduct is validly prohibited by statute. As
the Court put it in Employment Division v. Smith,23 "The protection
that the First Amendment provides to 'legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion,' . . . does not extend to conduct that a State has
validly proscribed." '24 Thus, denial of unemployment compensation
to drug counsellors fired for ingesting the hallucinogenic drug peyote
as part of a religious ceremony would not be a burden requiring
free-exercise scrutiny if that conduct violates a statute and the statute
itself does not violate the free exercise clause.
If the government action that harmed claimant is not a cogniza-
ble burden on the exercise of religion, the free exercise clause does
not apply and the analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the challenged
government action is the kind of burden on religion that triggers free
exercise scrutiny, the analysis proceeds to the question of compliance.
2. Compliance: Is the government action supported by a
sufficient justification to withstand free exercise scrutiny?
Free exercise cases draw a distinction between government coer-
cion of religious belief and government coercion of religious conduct.
The former is absolutely banned; the latter may be constitutional if
the government ha a sufficient justification to satisfy the applicable
Id. Cf Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) ("coercion directed at the practice or
exercise of their religious beliefs").
22. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325. Cf Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (federal require-
ment that State use Social Security numbers in administering welfare programs is not the kind
of burden that triggers free exercise scrutiny).
23. 108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988).
24. Id. at 1451.
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level of means-end scrutiny."0 The next two sections discuss these
two strands of free exercise law.
a. Regulation of religious beliefs
Beginning with Reynolds v. United States,2 the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that government conduct regulating, coercing, or
burdening religious beliefs is absolutely banned. As Chief Justice
Waite put it in Reynolds, "Congress was deprived of all legislative
power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions .... .
Classic restatements of this rule include the following. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,"' Justice Roberts stated that the free exer-
cise clause "embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things the second
cannot be."'" In Braunfeld v. Brown,30 Chief Justice Warren wrote,
"The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute."31
Justice Brennan's landmark opinion in Sherbert v. Verner"3 stated,
"The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against
any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such . . ."" In
Employment Division v. Smith, " Justice Stevens' opinion referred
again to "[t]he distinction between the absolute constitutional protec-
tion against governmental regulation of religious beliefs on the one
hand, and the qualified protection against the regulation of relig-
iously motivated conduct . ...""
The point is so well-settled as to merit the label black-letter
law. Although absolute bans are rare in constitutional law, this is
one.
b. Coercion of religious conduct
As the foregoing quotes make clear, government regulation of
religiously motivated conduct is not absolutely banned. Instead, the
Supreme Court has decided that government coercion of religious
25. See infra note 36 for an explanation of means-end scrutiny.
26. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Reynolds was "the first major 'free exercise' case." G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1510 (1lth ed. 1985).
27. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
28. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29. Id. at 303-04.
30. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
31. Id. at 603.
32. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
33. Id. at 402 (emphasis in original).
34. 108 S. Ct. 1444 (1988).
35. Id. at 1450 n.13.
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conduct is unconstitutional unless the justification for the coercion is
sufficient to satisfy the applicable level of means-end scrutiny. 86
The Supreme Court has adopted two versions of means-end
scrutiny as the tests for determining whether the government's justi-
fication satisfies the free exercise clause. As a general rule, the strict
scrutiny test is applied and government burdens on religious conduct
are unconstitutional unless the government can satisfy this test.87
However, there are two situations which constitute exceptions to this
general rule. In instances where the burden is imposed by military
authorities on military personnel or by prison authorities on prison-
ers, the government only needs to survive rationality review. 8 The
next two sections will discuss the lines of cases which apply these
two tests.
1) Strict scrutiny: the general rule
In the vast majority of cases, government burdens on the exer-
cise of religion are subject to a strong presumption of unconstitution-
ality and violate the free exercise clause unless the government can
satisfy strict scrutiny by proving that the burdens are necessary to
further a compelling interest.8 The structure of the analysis here is
identical to that used in strict scrutiny cases involving the due pro-
cess, equal protection, and free speech clauses.40 Strict scrutiny has
two prongs, the first of which has two components. The government
must first prove that its conduct furthers a compelling interest, that
is, that the conduct was undertaken for a purpose that is compelling
36. See Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 449 (1988) ("Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination
of the purposes (ends) which cdnduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to
further those purposes.").
37. Generally speaking, strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of means-end scrutiny.
38. Rationality review, in contrast to strict scrutiny, is the least intense level of means-
end scrutiny.
39. The leading case on this point is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Early
cases suggested that, while government restrictions on religious beliefs are absolutely prohib-
ited, the government has virtually unlimited power to restrict religiously motivated conduct.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Sherbert, the Court jumped nearly
to the opposite extreme, imposing strict limits on the government's ability to coerce conduct
contrary to religious beliefs. The Sherbert strict-scrutiny test has been reinforced in numerous
later cases. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). As the
Court explained in Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141, "Both Sherbert and Thomas held that such in-
fringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justificd only by proof by the
State of a compelling interest."
40. See Galloway, supra note 36, at 453-55.
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(very important) and that the conduct comprises a substantially ef-
fective method for furthering that interest. Secondly, the government
must prove that the conduct was necessary, that is, the government
action was the least onerous alternative available for furthering the
interest.
a) Did the conduct further a compelling interest?
(1) Compelling interest
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the
conduct imposing a burden on the free exercise of religion was un-
dertaken to further a compelling purpose. To satisfy this require-
ment, the government must show that its purpose was both constitu-
tionally permissible and very strong. In addition, the purpose relied
upon must have been the government's actual purpose rather than a
hypothetical purpose dreamed up after the fact by a government at-
torney or judge.
Strict scrutiny involves a stringent version of end-scrutiny that
often results in invalidation of the challenged conduct. For instance,
the Court has held that preventing fraudulent unemployment claims
is not a compelling interest.41 Similarly, it has held that the interests
in minimizing burdens on unemployment insurance funds and
preventing government inquiries into religious beliefs are not
compelling.42
More interesting, however, are the cases holding that the gov-
ernment's interests are sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict scru-
tiny. The Court has found the following interests to be compelling:
"maintaining a sound tax system,"' s maintaining the solvency of the
Social Security Trust' Fund,"" eradicating racial discrimination in
schools,' providing manpower for the armed services,' and preserv-
ing a uniform day of rest.' 7 These decisions suggest that the compel-
ling interest test in free exercise cases may not be as strict as, for
example, in equal protection cases involving racial classifications dis-
41. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
42. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717.
43. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2149 (1989).
44. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
45. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
46. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971).
47. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (as interpreted by Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963)).
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favoring minorities and in free speech cases involving prior
restraints.
(2) Substantially effective means
The "compelling interest" prong of strict scrutiny requires not
only that the government have a compelling interest, but also that
the government's conduct "further" that interest, i.e., that the con-
duct be a substantially effective means for advancing that interest.48
This requirement, which is frequently buried in other strict
scrutiny cases before the Supreme Court, has been very much in the
forefront in free exercise cases. Wisconsin v. Yoder"0 is a good exam-
ple. The question in that case was whether a mandatory school at-
tendance law for children under sixteen violated the free exercise
rights of Amish parents. Defending its compulsion of conduct pro-
scribed by the Amish religion, the government invoked the interests
in preparing individuals for participation in the political system and
developing self-sufficient citizens. The Supreme Court assumed, ar-
guendo, that the interests might be sufficiently strong to satisfy strict
scrutiny, but held that the requirement of an additional year or two
in school is not a substantially effective method for furthering the
purposes. As the Court put it, the additional education would "do
little to serve those interests." 50
b) Is the conduct necessary?
To satisfy the final prong of strict scrutiny, the government
must prove that the challenged burden on religion is necessary to
further a compelling interest. In other words, imposing the burden
on religion must be the "least onerous alternative" available for fur-
thering the compelling interest. If another equally effective yet less
onerous alternative is available, there is no compelling justification
for imposing the burden, and the government should use the less
onerous alternative to promote its compelling interest.
The necessity requirement has proved fatal to the government's
argument in some cases. In Sherbert v. Verner,1 for example, denial
of unemployment benefits to an employee who was discharged for
refusing to work on his Sabbath was held unconstitutional in part
because the government had failed to disprove the availability of less
48. Galloway, supra note 36, at 450.
49. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
50. Id. at 222.
51. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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onerous alternatives for preventing fraud."2
The government is not required, however, to use less onerous
alternatives that will not effectively promote its compelling interest.
In Braunfeld v. Brown,5" for example, the Court held that Sunday
closing laws are constitutional, rejecting the less onerous alternative
of allowing exemptions for religious objectors because that alterna-
tive would not be effective.5 It is unsettled whether the government
must use effective less onerous alternatives that it believes are not
"equally effective."
2) Rationality review: the exception
In two recent cases, 5 the Court declared that government coer-
cion of religious conduct in certain specific contexts is subject to ra-
tionality review rather than strict scrutiny. In analyzing these excep-
tions, one should ask first whether rationality review is applicable
and second whether rationality review is satisfied.
a) Is rationality review applicable?
The two exceptions recognized so far involve military and
prison contexts in which the Justices believe they should defer to
choices made by other government officials. Goldman v. Wein-
berger56 upheld an Air Force ban on wearing hats, holding that the
application of the ban to a yarmulke did not violate the free exercise
clause. Stressing that courts should defer to military judgments that
are reasonable and even-handed, the Court applied rationality re-
view rather than strict scrutiny.
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz57 upheld a prison work regulation
preventing Muslim prisoners from attending Jumu'ah, a noontime
religious rite. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion explained,
"To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison offi-
cials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe
constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less re-
strictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged constitutional in-
fringements of fundamental constitutional rights." 8 Applying ration-
52. Id. at 407.
53. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
54. Id. at 608.
55. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1987).
56. 475 U.S. 503 (1987).
57. 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1988).
58. Id. at 2404.
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ality review, the Court held that the work regulation is constitutional
because it is reasonably related to achieving order and security and
rehabilitating prisoners.
In short, rationality review is applicable in cases where reli-
gious coercion is imposed by military or prison officials. In the fu-
ture, the Court may find other similar contexts where judicial defer-
ence is required and where rationality review should be used rather
than strict scrutiny. One possible example would be mental hospi-
tals, where the custodial setting may require deference similar to that
accorded to prison officials. Once rationality review is found to ap-
ply, the next step in the analysis concerns whether rationality review
is met.
b) Is rationality review satisfied?
Rationality review is a mild two-prong form of means-end scru-
tiny that requires claimant to prove that the government action is not
a rational method for furthering any permissible government inter-
est.5 When this test is applicable, the government action is constitu-
tional if it has any valid purpose and if the means chosen are ra-
tional. In such cases, a presumption of constitutionality applies, and
the burden of proof is on claimant to show either that the govern-
ment has no valid purpose or that the means chosen plainly will not
further any such purpose. It is quite easy for the government to sat-
isfy rationality review, so in most cases the burden on religion will
not violate the free exercise clause in such contexts.
To summarize, if the free exercise clause is applicable because
the government has imposed a cognizable burden on religious belief
or conduct, one must characterize the burden and apply the appro-
priate test. If the burden is on religious belief, the government's con-
duct is absolutely banned. If the burden is on religious conduct, then
strict scrutiny is applicable unless the burden is imposed by military,
prison, or other similar officials and rationality review therefore
applies.
If the free exercise clause is inapplicable or the government has
satisfied the applicable tests developed by the Supreme Court for en-
forcing that limit, claimant loses on the merits, and the analysis ends.
If, on the other hand, the preliminary requirements are met and
claimant prevails on the merits by proving that the free exercise
clause is applicable and the government did not comply with the
59. See Galloway, supra note 36, at 451-53.
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clause's requirements, claimant wins on the merits, and the final is-
sue is what remedies are in order.
C. Remedies
This article will not discuss issues concerning remedies in free
exercise cases. Suffice it to say that courts have broad powers to en-
join government conduct that violates the clause and to award dam-
ages to claimants whose rights have been violated.
III. CONCLUSION
Basic free exercise analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the
preliminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and government
action) must be met. Second, the merits of the free exercise claim
must be considered. One must determine whether the free exercise
clause is applicable, that is, whether the government has imposed a
burden or denied a benefit because of belief or conduct required by
religion, or because of refusal to hold a belief or engage in conduct
prohibited by religion. If so, one must determine whether the gov-
ernment has complied with the requirements of the free exercise
clause. If the burden is on claimant's belief, government interference
is absolutely prohibited and will automatically be deemed unconsti-
tutional. If the burden is on claimant's conduct, one must determine
whether strict scrutiny or rationality review is applicable and
whether the applicable test is satisfied. If the free exercise clause is
applicable and the government did not comply with its requirements,
claimant wins on the merits, and questions concerning remedies must
be addressed. Hopefully, this analytical model will help law stu-
dents, lawyers, and judges conduct free exercise analyses in an or-
derly and accurate fashion.
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